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Venezuelan Prison Subculture 
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This article discusses the self-regulation of social life by inmates 
inside a Venezuelan prison. I focus on the development and use of intra-
group indigenous norms, and institutions and processes, to handle 
individual and collective disputes arising out of social interactions 
between inmates, including the adjudication and enforcement mechanisms 
that ensure the effectiveness of the system. This article contributes to the 
emerging literature on private governance vis-à-vis state regulation and 
the factors that contribute to foster law-abiding behavior among those 
who are routinely seen at odds with the official legal system. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A recent cover of Time magazine depicts a group of raggedy half-naked 
inmates sitting in a crowded cell at a police station in Venezuela’s capital, with a 
caption that reads, “Venezuela is dying.”1 The black and white picture, taken 
through the deteriorated metal bars of a holding cell, offers just a glimpse of the 
dire situation of the criminal justice system in that country. The deep crisis that 
affects Venezuela is well documented, and the situation seems to be getting worse 
at a fast pace. From the recent malaria epidemic, to the scarcity of food and 
medicines, to the rampant crime rates, to and the decay of the country’s most basic 
infrastructure, the once prosperous South American democracy appears to be on 
the verge of a humanitarian crisis.2 Venezuela’s dramatic journey from riches to rags 
in the last two decades and the country’s abysmal decline—despite being one of the 
largest oil producers in the world—is now perplexing to many.3 
The situation of the country’s prison system is one of the many signs of 
institutional decay.4 Several international organizations, NGOs, and other experts 
have reported the dramatic conditions of Venezuela’s jails in terms of being 
overcrowded, understaffed, and saturated with corruption and crime.5 The inmate 
population has grown, prison-related violence has spiraled out of control, and the 
perception is that the government has lost its grip on the situation.6 
 
1. Ioan Grillo, Venezuela is Dying, TIME, Aug. 22, 2016, at cover; see also Ioan Grillo, Inside the 
Hell of Venezuelan Police Prisons, TIME ( June 8, 2016), http://time.com/4360758/inside-the-hell-of-
venezuelan-police-prisons/ [ https://web.archive.org/web/20160608165610/http://time.com/ 
4360758/inside-the-hell-of-venezuelan-police-prisons/]. 
2. Venezuela: Stubborn Politics Accelerate Catastrophic Humanitarian Crisis, AMNESTY INT’L 
( June 10, 2016, 5:00 PM), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/06/venezuela-stubborn-
politics-accelerate-catastrophic-humanitarian-crisis/ [ https://perma.cc/YA67-A8MH]. 
3. Rick Gladstone, How Venezuela Fell into Crisis, and What Could Happen Next, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 27, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/28/world/americas/venezuela-crisis-what-
next.html; see also Gabriel Hetland, How Severe is Venezuela’s Crisis?, NATION ( June 22, 2016),  
https://www.thenation.com/article/how-severe-is-venezuelas-crisis/ [ https://web.archive.org/web/ 
20160623163259/https://www.thenation.com/article/how-severe-is-venezuelas-crisis/]; Gillian  
B. White & Bourree Lam, What’s at Stake in Venezuela’s Economic Crisis, ATLANTIC ( July 5,  
2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/07/venezuela-economic-crisis/490031/ 
[ https://perma.cc/VE73-EBRT ]. 
4. World Report: Venezuela (2017), HUM. RTS. WATCH, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/
2017/country-chapters/venezuela [ https://perma.cc/537A-RZ5D] ( last updated 2018). 
5. See generally COMISIÓN INTERAMERICANA DE DERECHOS HUMANOS, INFORME SOBRE LOS 
DERECHOS HUMANOS DE LAS PERSONAS PRIVADAS DE LIBERTAD EN LAS AMÉRICAS (2011),  
https://www.oas.org/es/cidh/ppl/docs/pdf/ppl2011esp.pdf [ https://perma.cc/2NL7-TPZZ]; 
OBSERVATORIO VENEZOLANO DE PRISIONES, INFORME GENERAL SOBRE LA SITUACIÓN 
CARCELARIA EN VENEZUELA (2015), http://oveprisiones.org/web/wp-content/uploads/Informe-
General-Octubre-2015-.pdf [ https://web.archive.org/web/20160207141650/http://oveprisiones.org/ 
web/wp-content/uploads/Informe-General-Octubre-2015-.pdf ]  [ hereinafter OVP 2015 REPORT]. 
6. Entregaron Informe al Parlamento Sobre Crisis Penitenciaria en Venezuela, NACIONAL  
(Aug. 24, 2017, 1:34 PM ) , http://www.el-nacional.com/noticias/asamblea-nacional/entregaron-
informe-parlamento-sobre-crisis-penitenciaria-venezuela_200339 [ https://perma.cc/AV7H-CNAJ]. 
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In the late nineties, some efforts were made to ameliorate the condition of the 
prisons and the entire criminal justice system through a legislative overhaul, but the 
results were insignificant at best.7 The centerpiece of this effort was an ambitious 
reform of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The reform instituted the jury system, 
expanded prosecutorial powers, reduced the length of pre-trial detention, and 
included other provisions aimed at improving the criminal justice system overall.8 
By instituting an adversarial, oral, and speedy procedure, the new Code was 
supposed to “create a more efficient and equitable criminal justice system, which 
would provide legal certainty and would contribute to the fight against crime.”9 The 
long anticipated Code, which was officially titled Organic Code of Penal Procedure, 
was finally enacted in 1998. The government vowed that it would bring a swift 
solution to the most critical problems of the Venezuelan criminal justice system.10 
Unfortunately, the newly minted legislation and related policies did not 
produce the intended results.11 At the same time the 1998 Code was enacted, the 
rate of violent crimes continued to increase exponentially.12 The reform had to be 
reversed or retooled at least twice within the next five years in order to adapt it to 
the reality of the Venezuelan society, but even then, the situation worsened.13 The 
astronomical rates of pre-trial detention have continued, incarceration is still used 
as the only means of official punishment, the jury system has been poorly 
implemented, and the prison system has collapsed.14 Furthermore, the exacerbation 
of the political crisis and an upsurge in the murder rate—to one of the highest in 
Latin America—has aggravated an already difficult situation.15 
In terms of the country’s inmate population, the average maximum capacity 
of the existing penitentiaries almost quadrupled in Venezuela in 2015.16 In some 
cases, the overcrowding level reached an astronomical figure of 918%.17 Table One 
below shows the overpopulation level in seven Venezuelan penitentiaries for 2015.18 
 
7. Andrés Antillano, La Reforma Policial en Venezuela, 16 CIVITAS – REVISTA DE CIÊNCIAS 
SOCIAIS 625, 626 (2016). 
8. Luisa Leal & Adela García, La Reforma de la Justicia Penal en Venezuela: Un Punto de Vista 
Criminológico, 30 CAPÍTULO CRIMINOLÓGICO 20, 20 (2002). 
9. Carmen Alguíndigue & Rogelio Pérez Perdomo, The Inquisitor Strikes Back: Obstacles to the 
Reform of Criminal Procedure, 15 SW. J. INT’L L. 101, 104 (2008-2009). 
10. Pablo Leonte Han Chen, Algunas Reflexiones Sobre la Reforma al Código Orgánico Procesal 
Penal Venezolano (Agosto, 2000), 29 CAPÍTULO CRIMINOLÓGICO 86, 87 (2001). 
11. Alguíndigue & Perdomo, supra note 9, at 109. 
12. Id. 
13. Id. 
14. OVP 2015 REPORT, supra note 5, at 10. 
15. Kevin Rawlison, Global Homicide Rate Rises for First Time in More than a Decade, 
GUARDIAN (Dec. 7, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/dec/07/global-homicide-
rate-rises-first-time-decade-venezuela-jamaica [ https://perma.cc/GWE6-CY9J ]. 
16. See World Prison Brief: Venezuela, INST. CRIM. POL’Y RES., http://www.prisonstudies.org/
country/venezuela [ https://perma.cc/U4LM-FNQZ] ( last visited Apr. 18, 2018). 
17. OVP 2015 REPORT, supra note 5, at 11. 
18. Id. 
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Table 1 
Overpopulation in Seven Venezuelan Penitentiaries (2015) 
Penitentiary Percentage of overpopulation  
Internado Judicial de Carabobo 132% 
Penitenciaría General de Venezuela 434% 
Internado Judicial de Anzoátegui 189% 
Centro Penitenciario El Dorado 280% 
Internado Judicial Región Insular 273% 
Internado Judicial de Yaracuy 344% 
Centro Penitenciario de Aragua 918% 
Total average 367.14% 
 
To make things worse, the number of prison workers and law enforcement 
personnel assigned to the different penitentiaries has dropped dramatically.19 
Several prisons were also closed down, supposedly to give way to the construction 
of new modern facilities, but in reality, only three centers have been built out of the 
twenty-four promised by the Minister of the Popular Power for Penitentiary Matters 
in 2012.20 
In most—if not all—of the existing prisons, there is hardly any maintenance, 
cleaning, or repairs done.21 Inmates have no access to doctors, nurses, or medical 
supplies; the drinking water and food are scarce; and there are frequent allegations 
of police abuse and physical humiliation to both the inmates and their relatives 
during visitations.22 Unsurprisingly, the inmates have reacted with frequent protests, 
hunger strikes, and numerous bouts of violence that have often ended in deadly 
confrontations with police forces.23 As a result, the Venezuelan prison has become 
much more than a place for temporary confinement and social rehabilitation. 
Despite the fact that Venezuela abolished capital punishment in 1863, more often 
than not, incarceration is a death sentence unto itself.24 As shown in Table Two 
 
19. Id. 
20. Thabata Molina, Venezuela Necesita 25 Cárceles Para Descongestionar el Sistema Penitenciario, 
NACIONAL (Oct. 28, 2012, 3:28 PM), http://www.el-nacional.com/noticias/sucesos/venezuela-
necesita-carceles-para-descongestionar-sistema-penitenciario_170899 [ https://perma.cc/8XSL-HRL4]. 
21. S.G., Este Año Hubo 30% Más Víctimas en las Cárceles, NACIONAL (Dec. 15, 2017, 1:15 
AM), http://www.el-nacional.com/noticias/sucesos/este-ano-hubo-mas-victimas-las-carceles_ 
215526 [ https://perma.cc/U9F2-CZML]. 
22. Jorge Benezra, On the Inside: Venezuela’s Most Dangerous Prison, TIME ( June 6, 2013), 
http://time.com/3800088/on-the-inside-venezuelas-most-dangerous-prison/ [ https://web.archive.org/ 
web/20150422050649/http://time.com/3800088/on-the-inside-venezuelas-most-dangerous-prison/]. 
23. See Grillo, supra note 1; see also OVP 2015 REPORT, supra note 5, at 14. 
24. Antonio María Delgado, El Horror de las Cárceles en Venezuela, NUEVO HERALD (Sep. 16, 
2012, 5:00 AM) http://www.elnuevoherald.com/noticias/article2017775.html [https://web.archive.org/ 
web/20170419024744/http://www.elnuevoherald.com/noticias/article2017775.html]. 
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below, between 1999 and 2015, a total of 6,581 inmates lost their lives, and 16,417 
were injured in prison-related violence.25 
 
Table 2 
Deaths and injuries in Venezuelan Prisons (1999-2015) 
Year Injured Deaths Total
1999 1,695 390 2,085
2000 1,255 338 1,593
2001 1,285 300 1,585
2002 1,249 244 1,493
2003 903 250 1,153
2004 1,428 402 1,830
2005 727 408 1,135
2006 982 412 1,394
2007 1,023 498 1,521
2008 854 422 1,276
2009 635 366 1,001
2010 967 476 1,443
2011 1,457 560 2,017
2012 1,132 591 1,723
2013 616 506 1,122
2014 179 309 488
2015 (1st 
semester) 
30 109 139 
Total 16,417 6,581 22,998
 
The dramatic state of Venezuelan prisons has garnered the attention of local 
and foreign NGOs, regional and international human rights organizations, and 
activists calling for swift government action.26 In several occasions, Venezuelan 
public officials have vowed to allocate more resources to tackle the crisis, and in 
2011, then-President Hugo Chavez even created a special Ministry for Penitentiary 
Services.27 Nevertheless, as described earlier, the result has been woefully 
inadequate. The general perception is that neither security guards nor government 
 
25. OVP 2015 REPORT, supra note 5, at 17. 
26. See, e.g., Amnistía Internacional, Descubrimiento de Fosa Común en un Centro Penitenciario 
Ilustra la Grave Crisis Carcelaria en Venezuela, PROVEA (Mar. 15, 2017), http://www.derechos.org.ve/
actualidad/amnistia-internacional-descubrimiento-de-fosa-comun-en-un-centro-penitenciario-ilustra-
la-grave-crisis-carcelaria-en-venezuela [ https://perma.cc/NBS4-DCW2]; Audiencias CIDH: Libertad 
de Expression, Derecho a la Vivienda, Situación de DDHH en las Cárceles y Arco Minero, PROVEA  
(Dec. 5, 2016), http://www.derechos.org.ve/actualidad/audiencias-cidh-libertad-de-expresion-
derecho-a-la-vivienda-situacion-de-ddhh-en-las-carceles-y-arco-minero [ https://perma.cc/VMY3-
HUT5]. 
27. Decree 8,266 ( July 26, 2011) (Venez.). 
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employees keep order in the prisons and that the only effective form of social 
control depends on the inmates themselves.28 
The foreign press, including The New York Times,29 the Guardian,30 and 
PBS,31 has published stories describing outlandish scenes of debauchery and excess 
in some prisons, where inmates host frequent drug and sex fueled parties with 
prostitutes, rap singers, and other “special visitors” who are smuggled in along with 
weapons, high-end electronics, and other items from the outside world.32 In some 
institutions, like the San Antonio penitentiary in Margarita Island, there are outdoor 
pools, dance floors, cockfighting rings, and other recreational areas built by the 
prisoners themselves or by hired crews brought from the outside.33 The internal 
illegal drug market has also reportedly flourished to the point that some people 
allegedly visit the prison to just buy drugs.34 This is possible in great part due to the 
fact that prison guards only search those entering the premises and not those who 
leave.35 
The almost total absence of government oversight and the institutional 
disarray has not only allowed these and other extravagances,36 but it has also enabled 
certain groups of inmates to expand the reach of their criminal networks and to 
establish powerful internal hierarchies that rely on the pervasive use of violence as 
a mechanism of social control.37 The beliefs, values, practices, and norms that 
prevail among the prisoners, which differ from those of mainstream society, allow 
 
28. See Segundo Mendoza, Los Pranes Mandan en Cárceles y el Gobierno Negocia con  
Ellos, TIEMPO ( June 12, 2012), http://www.diarioeltiempo.com.ve/V3_Secciones/index.php? 
id=124172012. 
29. Simon Romero, Where Prisoners Can Do Anything, Except Leave, N.Y. TIMES ( June 3, 
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/04/world/americas/04venez.html [ https://web.archive.org/ 
web/20180131102215/http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/04/world/americas/04venez.html]. 
30. Virginia López, Gangster’s Paradise: Prisoners Make Mockery of Venezuela’s  
Jails, GUARDIAN (Feb. 5, 2013, 4:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/feb/05/
prisoners-make-mockery-venezuela-jails [ https://perma.cc/MXT9-9A4H]. 
31. Steve Inskeep, Inmates in a Venezuelan Prison Build a World of Their Own, NPR ( June 11, 
2013, 3:21 AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2013/06/11/190392074/inmates-in-a-
venezuelan-prison-build-a-world-of-their-own [ https://web.archive.org/web/20150922135751/ 
http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2013/06/11/190392074/inmates-in-a-venezuelan-prison-
build-a-world-of-their-own]. 
32. See Romero, supra note 29. 
33. See Alfredo Meza, Una Cárcel con Discoteca, Ahora en Venezuela, PAÍS (Feb. 15,  
2016, 8:49 PM), https://elpais.com/internacional/2016/02/15/america/1455576486_264845.html 
[ https://web.archive.org/web/20180413163609/https://elpais.com/internacional/2016/02/15/ame
rica/1455576486_264845.html]; see also Romero, supra note 29. 
34. See Romero, supra note 29. 
35. Id. 
36. Id. 
37. See El Pran: ¿Símbolo o Significado?, OBSERVATORIO VENEZOLANO VIOLENCIA (Nov. 15, 
2016), http://observatoriodeviolencia.org.ve/el-pran-simbolo-o-significado [ https://perma.cc/ 
K6XE-QRVA]. 
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us to speak of a “prison subculture.”38 This subculture, which is often described 
pejoratively, contains at least three key distinctive characteristics. 
First, the members of the Venezuelan prison subculture have an internal social 
and political hierarchy with well-defined roles and a clear power structure.39 Second, 
violence or the threat of violence are ubiquitous in the prison subculture and are 
used widely as a means to attain and preserve political power and as a tool for 
maintaining the internal social control.40 Despite its prevalence, intra-prison 
violence is generally monopolized by group leaders and subject to a strict normative 
standard that may or may not clash with the values and principles of the formal legal 
system and mainstream society.41 Third, the Venezuelan prison subculture depends 
on a particular set of internally-created norms that govern all aspects of individual 
and group interactions. Strict observance to these norms is carefully overseen by 
group leaders, with cooperation from the inmate community at large.42 This set of 
“indigenous”43 norms are what Crespo & Bolaños have referred to as the Code of 
the Inmate (“El Código del Preso”), which is not only limited to govern inmate-to-
inmate relations,44 but also deals with social behavior involving inmate-to-warden, 
inmate-to-visitors/outsiders, and inmate-to-institutions (i.e., the prison, or the 
formal legal system as a whole).45 
Not all aspects of the Venezuelan prison subculture are negative. In order to 
make up for the lack of an adequate government infrastructure, inmates have pooled 
resources to offer certain services such as infirmaries, kitchens, and internal security, 
which under normal circumstances would be fulfilled by prison wardens and other 
official employees. Depending on the prison, the purchasing power of the inmate 
population, and the possibility of exerting influence over corrupt wardens or even 
high ranking government officials, some prison gang leaders have managed to bring 
a glimpse of outside life comfort to their fellow inmates.46 Some of these luxuries 
are makeshift barbershops, cybercafés, call centers, and even stalls that sell cigarettes 
and drinks. Multiple services and facilities are found throughout different areas as 
if the entire prison were a regular town.47 
The provision of goods and services, the maintenance of social order, and the 
overall functioning of prison life would not be possible without the social 
 
38. Freddy Crespo, Cárceles: Subcultura y Violencia Entre Internos, 28 REVISTA CENIPEC 123, 
129 (2009); see also Freddy A. Crespo & Mireya Bolaños, Código del Preso: Acerca de los Efectos de la 
Subcultura del Prisionero, 37 CAPÍTULO CRIMINOLÓGICO 53 (2009). 
39. Crespo, supra note 38, at 131. 
40. Id. at 132. 
41. Id. at 131–32. 
42. Id. 
43. The term “indigenous” is used in this context to convey a set of norms generated within a 
particular community outside of the formal legal system. 
44. See Crespo & Bolaños, supra note 38, at 61. 
45. Id. 
46. See Romero, supra note 29. 
47. Id. 
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organization achieved by the prisoners through self-regulation and indigenous 
governance. Despite the fact that the prison owes its existence to the criminal justice 
system and every aspect related to the incarceration is supposedly governed by the 
official laws, the reality of Venezuelan prisons shows otherwise. The lack of 
adequate government infrastructure and the absence of a coherent policy in 
Venezuela’s prisons has left a vacuum, which the inmates themselves seem to have 
fulfilled. As this Article reveals, the Code of the Inmate has taken over almost all 
aspects in the life of the incarcerated, from the most personal or intimate facets to 
the most general social interactions, thus taking over the role that under normal 
circumstances would be performed by official institutions. The Code of the Inmate 
appears to have filled every imaginable crevasse in the life of those that inhabit the 
prisons whether they voluntarily accept it or not; from the most mundane aspects 
of life such as what clothes to dress, to what words to speak, and what religion to 
profess.48 This indigenous system of norms has created and given effect to different 
“rights” such as the right to food, to shelter, and to gain access to some benefits. 
This normative system has also fashioned litigation-like processes that members of 
the community use to channel their petitions, claims and grievances. 
Interestingly, the physical barrier that exists between the inmate and the 
outside world, which results from the act of incarceration, is also what has 
incentivized the emergence of a private indigenous order within the prison walls. 
This private order supersedes the official legal system as a main source of normative 
guidance; thus, creating a situation in which the absolute divorce between the law 
in the official books and the unofficial law in action could not be clearer. 
This Article focuses on the latter aspect. It explores the development and use 
of the intra-group norms that comprise the Code of the Inmate and their emergence 
and functioning outside, beyond, and even against the state. The discussion 
presented here contributes to the understanding of the intricate landscape of legal 
pluralism insofar as it captures a distinctive set of rule-making and rule-applying 
institutions, actors, and processes that are not part of the structure of the state but 
perform a state-like role.49 The normative system created by the inmates finds its 
source not in the state or in the official legal system but inside the community that 
it seeks to govern. As I explain later, of the many examples of plural normative 
orders, what stands out in the case of the Venezuelan prison community is the 
apparent contradiction between the extreme violent nature of its members and their 
desire to attain order, hierarchy, and social control. 
In the sections that follow, I discuss the development and use of the intra-
group indigenous norms fittingly labeled as Code of the Inmate. I also discuss the 
institutions and processes devised among Venezuelan inmates to enforce their 
group norms and adjudicate the disputes that arise from their everyday interactions. 
 
48. Crespo & Bolaños, supra note 38, at 62. 
49. Cf. Marc Galanter & Manuel A. Gómez, Waiting for Mendeleev: The Tangle of Indigenous 
Law, 10 FLA. INT’L U.L. REV. 1, 1–2 (2014) (discussing the landscape of legal pluralism). 
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This article hopes to contribute to the literature on private governance vis-à-vis state 
regulation and the factors that foster law-abiding behavior among those who are 
routinely seen at odds with the official legal system. 
I. SOCIAL ORDER WITHOUT AND AGAINST THE STATE 
The literature on indigenous order and unofficial regulation showcases myriad 
examples depicting situations of rule-making and rule-applying institutions that are 
not part of the state.50 Some of these normative orders appear to conform to the 
official legal system or supplement it. Others simply coexist and run parallel to state 
institutions, sometimes crossing paths with the official legal system along the way.51 
At the other end of the spectrum, there are some social realities in which existence 
and operation is precisely owed to a rejection or contradiction of the official legal 
system and which thrive in absence of any contact with the state.52 The landscape 
is complex, and the variances and combinations among actors, institutions, and 
processes seem endless. 
The case studies are as diverse and colorful as our modern interconnected 
society: Hasidic53 and Jain diamond dealers,54 cotton merchants,55 Brazilian 
beachgoers,56 cattle ranchers,57 sumo wrestlers,58 roller skaters,59 stand-up 
 
50. Id. 
51. Id. 
52. Id. 
53. Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the 
Diamond Industry, 11 J. LEGAL ST. 115 (1992); Barak D. Richman, Ethnic Networks, Extralegal 
Certainty, and Globalisation: Peering into the Diamond Industry, in LEGAL CERTAINTY BEYOND THE 
STATE: EMPIRICAL STUDIES AND THEORIES OF CHANGE ( Volkmar Gessner ed., 2013). 
54. Manuel A. Gómez, Precious Resolution: The Use of Intra-Community Arbitration by Jain 
Diamond Merchants, 2 BELGIAN REV. ARB. [B-ARBITRA] (2013). 
55. Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation Through 
Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724 (2001). 
56. Pedro R. Fortes, How Socio-Legal Norms Emerge Within Complex Networks: Law and 
(In)Formality at Ipanema Beach, 10 FLA. INT’L U.L. REV. 183 (2014). 
57. William A. Fischel, Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes by Robert  
C. Ellickson, 69 LAND ECON. 113 (1993) (book review). 
58. Mark D. West, Legal Rules and Social Norms in Japan’s Secret World of Sumo, 26 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 165 (1997). 
59. David Fagundes, Talk Derby to Me: Intellectual Property Norms Governing Roller Derby 
Pseudonyms, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1093 (2012). 
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comedians,60 French chefs,61 drag queens,62 festival attendees,63 motorcycle riders,64 
slum dwellers,65 and obviously the incarcerated.66 To reveal that this phenomenon 
is not new, we can also look at historical examples involving medieval traders 
throughout Europe,67 Dutch merchants in 17th century Amsterdam, pre-colonial 
African traders,68 inmates in the Andersonville prison during the American Civil 
War,69 and the camps organized by American miners across the western territories 
of the United States during the gold rush of the mid-1800s.70 
Despite their striking differences, these examples have at least two things in 
common. First, the presence of a close-knit community whose members are 
connected with each other based on certain ties (e.g., social, economic, ethnic, 
religious, etc.) that are generally developed over time and strengthened by a 
common set of values or aspirations (e.g., economic gain, social harmony, spiritual 
fulfillment, etc.). Second, relations between group members are governed by 
internally created norms, rules, or customs, which participants follow instead of the 
official legal system. 
The reason why group members cooperate or display law-abiding behavior in 
each of these indigenous contexts also varies alongside a spectrum. Some people 
are believed to follow community rules because of the presence of an authority or 
someone in a position of power vis-à-vis the rest of the group.71 The source of said 
authority, its perceived legitimacy, and the means through which it is able to 
 
60. Dotan Oliar & Christopher Jon Sprigman, There’s No Free Laugh (Anymore): The Emergence 
of Intellectual Property Norms and the Transformation of Stand-Up Comedy, 94 VA. L. REV 1787 (2008). 
61. See generally Emmanuelle Fauchart & Eric von Hippel, Norms-Based Intellectual Property 
Systems: The Case of French Chefs, 19 ORG. SCI. 187 (2006). 
62. Eden Sarid, Don’t Be a Drag, Just Be a Queen—How Drag Queens Protect Their Intellectual 
Property Without Law, 10 FLA. INT’L U.L. REV. 133 (2014). 
63. Manuel A. Gómez, Order in the Desert: Law Abiding Behavior at Burning Man, 2013  
J. DISP. RES. 349. 
64. Mitch Librett, Wild Pigs and Outlaws: The Kindred Worlds of Policing and Outlaw Bikers, 4 
CRIME, MEDIA, CULTURE 257 (2008); John W. Schouten & James H. McAlexander, Subcultures of 
Consumption: An Ethnography of the New Bikers, 22 J. CONSUMER RES. 43 (1995). 
65. Manuel A. Gómez, The Tower of David: Social Order in the Vertical Slum, 10 FLA. INT’L 
U.L. REV. 215 (2014). 
66. David B. Skarbek & Andrew Marcum, Polycentrism and Prison Gangs, in 4 THE ANNUAL 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE WEALTH AND WELL-BEING OF NATIONS 115, 118 (Emily Chamlee-Wright 
ed., 2012); see generally David B. Skarbek, Governance and Prison Gangs, 105 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 702 
(2011) [ hereinafter, Skarbek, Prison Gangs]. 
67. Paul Milgrom, Douglass North & Barry Weingast, The Role of Institutions in the Revival of 
Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne Fairs, 2 ECON. & POL. 1 (1990). 
68. Peter Leeson, Social Distance and Self-Enforcing Exchange, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. 161 (2008). 
69. See generally WILLIAM MARVEL, ANDERSONVILLE: THE LAST DEPOT (Gary W. Gallagher 
ed., 1994). 
70. CHARLES HOWARD SHINN, MINING CAMPS: A STUDY IN AMERICAN FRONTIER 
GOVERNMENT (1884). 
71. See generally STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY: AN EXPERIMENTAL VIEW 
(1974). 
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persuade or compel others to obey, is also the subject of discussion.72 In other 
instances, where the presence of an authority is not clear or simply not relevant, 
cooperation may result from self-interest, an internal moral code, fear to the 
supernatural, or a combination of different factors.73 
The scholarly literature has also shown an interest in the social control 
mechanisms that step in when group members fail to cooperate with pre-established 
norms or disobey an express authoritative decision.74 The dispute processing 
mechanisms and fora range from court-like adjudication procedures, arbitration, 
conciliation, and mediation to self-help and avoidance.75 The realm of punishment 
and its nature is also broad. It includes economic, physical, and reputation-based 
sanctions where the possibility of losing face may be more important than 
confronting physical punishment or paying a fine. 
As I just mentioned, for a successful indigenous order to thrive, the values and 
norms of the relevant group or community do not need to be necessarily aligned 
with the principles of mainstream society or be endorsed by the official legal 
system.76 Moreover, there are instances in which the mere existence of the group is 
at odds with the formal legal codes or with societal values. As a result, their members 
are frequently forced to thread carefully between two systems: the official and the 
unofficial. Such is the case of illicit organizations like the mafia77 and prison gangs.78 
As I now turn to explain, the prison subculture is reflective of the realm of unofficial 
regulation in a very interesting way. 
Given their illegal nature, the underworld communities cannot rely on the 
official law to regulate the relations among their members. For example, the 
enforcement of a contract for the sale of illegal drugs or smuggled goods cannot 
depend on the application of contract law provisions,79 and those who have 
sustained losses as a result of non-compliance cannot seek the protection of official 
courts. Their best alternative is to turn to the social control mechanisms that operate 
within these communities. One of the main characteristics of these illicit indigenous 
forms of social control is that they do away with some of the safeguards afforded 
to ordinary citizens such as due process, equal treatment under the law, and the 
proscription of the use of violence or self-help to resolve disputes. Interestingly, it 
is precisely the lack of these mainstream features and the glorification of certain 
anti-social values, what help define underground communities. 
 
72. Thomas Blass, The Milgram Paradigm After 35 Years: Some Things We Know About 
Obedience to Authority, 29 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 955-78 (1999). 
73. See generally TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (2006). 
74. See generally TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE COOPERATE: THE ROLE OF SOCIAL 
MOTIVATIONS (2013). 
75. See generally Gómez, supra note 63. 
76. Id. 
77. FEDERICO VARESE, MAFIAS ON THE MOVE: HOW ORGANIZED CRIMES CONQUERS NEW 
TERRITORY (2011). 
78. See generally Skarbek, Prison Gangs, supra note 66. 
79. Id. at 702. 
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It is also because of these traits that illicit or underground communities are 
usually viewed as inferior, negative, or incomplete orders, which emerge and remain 
below the surface precisely because other forms of regulation are not possible.80 
Most of the attention given to illicit communities is on the potential harm that they 
may pose to society or their contribution toward creating chaos.81 In the case of the 
Venezuelan prison subculture described in this paper, its media portrayal pays more 
attention to the insubordination of inmates against societal values and the dangers 
that they pose to society than on any other features that they might have. 
Notwithstanding this portrayal, and contrary to the generalized belief, criminal 
groups and other illicit organizations may actually contribute to reducing anarchy 
and creating certainty among their members. In some cases, these groups may even 
provide a system of governance that protects property rights and assist with the 
enforcement of contracts when the state fails or is unable to do so. Inmates are 
interested in regulating their social dynamics not because they want to resist or 
challenge the official legal system, but because they need to regulate their own life 
behind bars and create certainty. 
One has to be careful not to idealize or glorify the perceived efficiencies of 
illicit or underground social organizations. Their main value is to their members and 
not to society at large. However, exploring the nuances and the social dynamics that 
take place in these otherwise unexplored and shunned spaces sheds light on the 
factors that promote cooperation and the role of legitimacy and other elements in 
the context of indigenous regulation. I now turn to describe this microcosm. 
II. A WORLD OF THEIR OWN: PRIVATE GOVERNANCE INSIDE A VENEZUELAN 
LOW-SECURITY PRISON82 
In a recent ethnographic study of a Venezuelan low security prison (penal 
abierto), Andrés Antillano described in great detail the social environment there, 
including norms and institutions created and followed by the inmates with almost 
absolute independence from the state.83 His research debunked and demystified in 
part the general perception that because of the inability of the official government 
 
80. EFRAT SHOHAM, PRISON TATTOOS: A STUDY OF RUSSIAN INMATES IN ISRAEL 5 (2015). 
81. Juan José Martinez D’Aubuisson & Steven Dudley, Where Chaos Reigns: Inside the San  
Pedro Sula Prison, INSIGHT CRIME (Feb. 2, 2017), https://www.insightcrime.org/investigations/
where-chaos-reigns-inside-the-san-pedro-sula-prison/ [https://perma.cc/35RP-3GBD]. 
82. This Section is largely based on a series of interviews with Andrés Antillano, Chair of the 
Department of Criminology at the Universidad Central de Venezuela, and one of the foremost 
authorities in the study of inmate communities in Venezuela. Antillano and his research team have been 
able to explore firsthand the realities of Venezuelan low security prisons through direct access to 
incarcerated individuals and their social networks. 
83. Andrés Antillano, Cuando los Presos Mandan: Control Informal Dentro de la Cárcel 
Venezolana, 24 ESPACIO ABIERTO CUADERNO VENEZOLANO SOCIOLOGÍA [ESPACIO ABIERTO] 16, 
39 (2015). 
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to administer penal institutions adequately, inmates live in a constant state of chaos, 
devoid of any rules and rational behavior.84 
The reality that Antillano described did not pretend to defy the media 
stories—like the ones mentioned in the introduction—depicting groups of 
Venezuelan inmates indulging in vices and bacchanalian activities but explained a 
social environment that coexists with it.85 Antillano’s main contribution was to 
uncover a little known facet in the life of incarcerated individuals in Venezuela, 
which is their remarkable level of social organization, sophisticated systems of rules, 
and indigenous institutions that help them attain and preserve social order in an 
otherwise anarchic situation.86 Other scholarly works by Crespo and Bolaños, and 
Añez Castillo have delved into exploring—mainly through ethnographic research—
other facets of Venezuela’s prison subculture, from a description of the so called 
Code of the Inmate, to the operation of prison gangs, and to the use of the Internet 
and social networks as a means of expression about life behind bars.87 
The academic literature recognizes the existence of a distinctive Venezuelan 
prison subculture featuring the three elements mentioned earlier: a unique 
hierarchical structure, the pervasive use of violence, and the existence of an 
indigenous system of norms that governs the interaction among inmates and 
others.88 Other comparative examples, resulting from research conducted in South 
American countries such as Brazil89 and Bolivia,90 have observed a similar trend. 
As mentioned earlier, the internal social and political structures created by the 
inmates in the Venezuelan context have thrived in part because of the failure of 
state institutions and the collapse of the criminal justice system. The indigenous 
order has, in a way, become a replacement for an official apparatus that is simply 
not there. It is important to note, however, that such an informal system of 
governance does much more than being a placeholder, for it also contributes to the 
creation and maintenance of a value and cultural system that serves the interests of 
the members of that community. The Venezuelan inmate community that 
comprises the focus of the academic literature—and also this Article—is the one 
that exists in a low security prison. The physical structure of Venezuelan low-
security prisons coupled with the fact that they are generally overcrowded and 
neglected by government officials, has allowed the inmates to occupy every 
 
84. Id. 
85. Id. 
86. Id. 
87. María Alejandra Añez Castillo, El Uso del Internet y las Redes Sociales como Medio de 
Expression de la Situación Carcelaria en Venezuela, 13 REVISTA ENCUENTROS 85 (2014); Crespo & 
Bolaños, supra note 38, at 53. 
88. Id. 
89. See generally KARINA BIONDI, SHARING THIS WALK: AN ETHNOGRAPHY OF PRISON LIFE 
AND THE PCC IN BRAZIL ( John F. Collins ed., 2016). 
90. See generally FRANCESCA CERBINI, LA CASA DE JABÓN: ETNOGRAFÍA DE UNA CÁRCEL 
BOLIVIANA (2012). 
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available space and take advantage of the social fabric to promote a self-regulated 
community devoid of any external social control. 
Maximum-security prisons, on the other hand, feature a strong presence of 
wardens, law enforcement, and other personnel in charge of executing the official 
rules; therefore, there is less room for the inmates to communicate and relate to 
each other.91 In maximum-security prisons, most inmates are also subject to 
constant physical isolation during the majority of the time, thus preventing them 
from becoming socially integrated into any community.92 These circumstances 
effectively hinder the emergence of any alternative social organization of inmates 
different from the hyper-structured arrangements created by the official system. I 
am by no means suggesting that maximum-security prisons are devoid of all types 
of community organization. I am simply suggesting that the chances of an 
organization established by maximum-security inmates is much less frequent than 
in low security prisons. 
A. Looking Into the Social Fabric of the Venezuelan Prison 
In addition to the three elements mentioned earlier (political and social 
hierarchy, pervasive use of violence, and internal normative system) that help 
describe the subculture of the low security prison in Venezuela, the social fabric 
created by the inmates is strengthened by certain symbolisms, values, and expected 
behavior such as the vocabulary, speech and other forms of communication among 
inmates; their dress code, manners, and social behavior; and their understanding of 
“property” and other rights while in confinement. I will discuss each in the 
following paragraphs. 
One of the most important, albeit subtle, forms of social regulation in the 
inmate community is the meticulous regulation of vocabulary and speech.93 
Contrary to the general perception about the prison as a hostile environment prone 
to verbal bullying or abuse, the use of innuendos and double entendres—sexual or 
otherwise—tend to be generally forbidden in Venezuelan prison subculture.94 
Those who dare to cross the invisible speech line are severely reprimanded.95 
Community members even go to great lengths to come up with “safe” words that 
leave little doubt about the seriousness or intended meaning of the speaker.96 Even 
common words such as egg, yucca, or milk are forbidden because of their alternative 
 
91. See generally SHARON SHALEV, SUPERMAX: CONTROLLING RISK THROUGH SOLITARY 
CONFINEMENT (2009). 
92. Daniel P. Mears & William D. Bales, Supermax Incarceration and Recidivism, 47 
CRIMINOLOGY 1131, 1166 (2009). 
93. Telephone Interview with Andrés Antillano, Chair of the Dep’t of Criminology, 
Universidad Central de Venez. (Nov. 30, 2016). 
94. Id. 
95. Id. 
96. See generally Yraima Camila Mogollón Martínez & Delci Torres, Palabras en Prisión: La Jerga 
como Expresión del Mundo Carcelario en Uribana Estado Lara, 34 PARADIGMA 73, 91 (2013). 
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vulgar meaning as male genitalia and semen.97 Instead of leche (milk) for example, 
inmates use vaquita ( l ittle cow); huevos (eggs) are called yenci; and the word for yuca 
(yucca) is just raíz (root).98 
Along the same lines, counting in “the hundreds” (los cientos) is also modified 
because of the phonetic similarity with the phrase, “I feel” (yo siento).99 As a result, 
the only acceptable way to say ciento uno (one hundred and one), for example, would 
be cien más uno or ciento y uno (one hundred plus one) to avoid giving the impression 
that one “feels” something.100 Inmates are also forbidden from using any words or 
expression that resemble police or government jargon.101 In many cases, the inmates 
invent their own words, thus creating an original slang often unintelligible to 
outsiders.102 The moral code established among inmates regarding speech is very 
strict and does not leave any room for relaxation.103 The rationale behind such an 
unyielding rule is the perceived need to eliminate or minimize any possible source 
of tension that sexual or other innuendos may create in an already charged and 
volatile environment. A violation to any implicit or explicit speech rule may carry 
severe punishment, which inmates call a chinazo (i.e., a hit from a stone thrown by 
a slingshot).104 
Physical appearance is another space subject to indigenous social regulation in 
the Venezuelan prison subculture. There is no legal requirement that mandates 
inmates to wear uniforms.105 Moreover, the precarious condition of the country and 
the general neglect of the prisons as described earlier make it nearly impossible for 
most inmates to be fully clothed or to even own bedding and other essentials.106 
Notwithstanding, there are certain codes of conduct related to clothing and 
accessories that are strongly enforced.107 For example, inmates are not supposed to 
wear dark sunglasses in the presence of any female relative visiting other prisoners, 
nor are they allowed to show their naked torso or stare directly at someone else’s 
spouse, girlfriend, or mother.108 
 
97. Egg (huevo) and yucca (yuca) are Spanish vulgarisms for testicles or penis. Similarly, milk 
( leche) is often used for semen. 
98. María I. Iglesias, Jerga Penitenciaria, UNIVERSAL (July 10, 2011), http://archivo.eluniversal.com/ 
2011/07/10/jerga-penitenciaria [ https://perma.cc/JD6C-USSP]; Añez Castillo, supra note 87 at 95. 
99. See generally Antillano, supra note 83. 
100. Id. 
101. Id. 
102. For a discussion about the development of slang in U.S. prisons, see WILLIAM  
K. BENTLEY & JAMES M. CORBETT, PRISON SLANG: WORDS AND EXPRESSIONS DEPICTING LIFE 
BEHIND BARS (1992), and Bert Little, Prison Lingo: A Style of American English Slang, 24 
ANTHROPOLOGICAL LINGUISTICS 206 (1982). 
103. Interview with Andrés Antillano, supra note 93. 
104. Id. 
105. Id. 
106. Grillo, supra note 1. 
107. Interview with Andrés Antillano, supra note 93. 
108. Id. 
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The Venezuelan code of the inmate also prescribes the avoidance of any 
unnecessary physical contact with others.109 Even the slightest accidental touch may 
be construed as an improper advance or unacceptable act of humiliation by 
cellmates.110 The use of one’s individual body is also subject to the careful scrutiny 
of the community.111 To that end, sentinels are posted in the bathrooms to ensure 
that no one crosses the line between right and wrong.112 An inmate who shaves his 
own legs may be shot by a sentinel for engaging in a type of conduct that runs 
against the macho culture of the prison; a similar fate would befall anyone caught 
masturbating or engaged in any other sexual act.113 In sum, any conduct, act, or 
speech that may appear ambiguous, suspicious, or that is perceived to potentially 
disturb the fragile order of the prison will be undoubtedly suppressed.114 Not only 
are those actively engaged in a forbidden conduct subject to punishment, but equally 
are those who are thought to provoke or invite such behavior.115 
The concept of property and other rights that mainstream society holds in 
high regard acquires a different tone in the Venezuelan prison subculture. On the 
one hand, the scarcity of space and the lack of physical barriers make it difficult for 
most inmates to claim exclusivity over a certain area or to safely store their 
possessions even within the confines of their own cells, in the rare cases when cells 
exist.116 Most “private” spaces are marked with makeshift curtains and similar 
dividers, which are also rare given the overcrowded environment of the prison.117 
On the other hand, the right to own certain things such as weapons is severely 
restricted and their use heavily regulated. Only those expressly authorized by El 
Pran (the Principal) may own or use weapons.118 In all instances, the acquisition, 
transfer, and custody of any guns or weapons are also the sole responsibility of an 
individual called El Parquero (the valet parking guy).119 
Money is another commodity in which ownership and use is restricted, and 
prepaid mobile phone cards have become the main currency among the 
incarcerated. As we will explain later, the ability to communicate with the outside 
and to preserve one’s social network is one of the most important assets for the 
members of the Venezuelan prison subculture. In any case, the use of non-monetary 
objects as currency is not unique to Venezuelan prisons, and a similar phenomenon 
 
109. Id. 
110. Id. 
111. Id. 
112. Id. 
113. Id. 
114. Id. 
115. Id. 
116. Id. 
117. Id. 
118. Id. 
119. Id. 
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has been reported among inmates in United States’ prisons regarding the use of 
ramen noodles and cigarettes instead of cash.120 
The scarcity of many essential means and the inadequacy of the facilities also 
forces inmates to pool resources and share everyday provisions at a higher rate than 
what people would do under ordinary circumstances.121 In this context, theft is 
severely punished, sometimes by expulsion from the community—described as ser 
anegado (“being drowned”)—or even death.122 I will return to this issue in the next 
section when addressing the adjudication of disputes. 
B. The Pran and his Car 
Some aspects of the Venezuelan prison subculture evoke life in medieval 
times. The same way in which the King and his Court were the center of political, 
economic, and social power in medieval era of Europe, the Pran and his Car are the 
centerpieces of the Venezuelan prison.123 The Pran or Principal is the head of the 
Car and also the leader of the community.124 The term Pran, which appears to have 
been originated in Puerto Rican prisons during the nineties, does not have any 
known meaning in the Spanish language, although some allege that it is an acronym 
of Preso-Rematado-Asesino-Nato (Prisoner-Overkilled-Born-Assassin).125 Others 
consider that Pran is simply a contraction of the term “Principal,” which is how 
these rulers are called in the community.126 Pranes are neither democratically elected 
nor appointed by the Car or any other organ; they govern as absolute monarchs 
with an iron fist but also a velvet glove for they are also concerned with maintaining 
the appearance of a good government.127 Pranes usually ascend to power through 
violent means against a previous Pran whose legitimacy has been questioned or 
when a previous Pran has died, gained freedom, or has been transferred out to 
another facility.128 Likewise, a Pran will cease in his role when deposed, killed, or 
removed by any other means.129 The transitional period between Pranes is generally 
 
120. See Maria Godoy, Ramen Noodles Are Now the Prison Currency of Choice, NPR (Aug. 26, 
2016), https://www.npr.org/sections/thesalt/2016/08/26/491236253/ramen-noodles-are-now-
the-prison-currency-of-choice [https://perma.cc/UH6Z-MCQG]. 
121. Interview with Andrés Antillano, supra note 93. 
122. Id. 
123. Id. 
124. See generally EN EL NOMBRE DEL PRAN: SEMBLANZA DE WILMER “WILMITO” BRIZUELA 
(2017) [ hereinafter EN EL NOMBRE DEL PRAN]. 
125. Francisco P. Alviárez, Conozca de Donde Vienen los “Pranes”, DIARIO CARACAS (Sept. 20, 
2013), http://diariodecaracas.com/que-sucede/conozca-donde-vienen-los-pranes [ https://perma.cc/ 
7EFC-SNE3]; see also PATRICIA CLAREMBAUX, A ESE INFIERNO NO VUELVO: UN VIAJE A LAS 
ENTRAÑAS DE LAS CÁRCELES VENEZOLANAS (2016). 
126. EN EL NOMBRE DEL PRAN, supra note 124. 
127. Interview with Andrés Antillano, supra note 93. 
128. EN EL NOMBRE DEL PRAN, supra note 124. 
129. Interview with Andrés Antillano, supra note 93. 
First to Printer_Gomez (Do Not Delete) 8/30/2018  10:42 AM 
200 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8:183 
 
extremely violent and unstable for the community, the same way that it often 
happened during times of the monarchy.130 
As a result of the hierarchical structure of the prison subculture the Pran and 
the members of his entourage/government are often exempted from the 
obligations demanded from the rest of the inmates or la población (populous).131 
Curiously, the Principal and his Carro (Car) are tasked with enforcing social behavior 
and ensuring that the población complies with the The Code of the Inmate, but at 
the same time they behave as if they are above the law.132 For example, the Principal 
may enjoy expensive electronics, decorative objects, specially prepared food, 
frequent visitors, and other perks that are beyond the reach of the general 
population.133 
The Pran rarely has any direct interaction with the rest of the inmates.134 He 
relies on his Segundo al mando or canciller (Second in Command or Chancellor) to 
mediate conflicts, seek counsel from other members of the Car, and deal with most 
mundane matters.135 The Pran’s personal security is assigned to a group of 
bodyguards called los Perros (the Dogs).136 Other tasks such as the overall safety and 
enforcement of community norms are assigned to the Pran’s trusted men whose 
allegorical name is los Luceros (Bright Lights)137 and sometimes even to indigenous, 
court-like organs like El Tribunal del Hampa (the Court of the Underworld), 
although self-policing is also common.138 
Other functions such as “tax” collection; the permit to sell cigarettes, food, 
drugs, alcohol, and any other commodity; or the provision of different services are 
also assigned based on decisions made by members of the Car.139 The size and 
specific functions of the Car varies by prison.140 In some penitentiaries there is just 
one Car, while in others there is a Car per each pavilion or major section.141 In this 
case, the different Cars may coexist as a result of specific arrangements between 
groups, although the possibility of skirmishes or wars for control of the prison is 
always latent.142 What appears to be a constant, however, is that Car members are 
hierarchically superior to the población.143 
 
130. Id. 
131. Id. 
132. Id. 
133. Id. 
134. Id. 
135. Id. 
136. Id. 
137. See Iglesias, supra note 98. 
138. Interview with Andrés Antillano, supra note 93. 
139. Id. 
140. Id. 
141. Id. 
142. Id. 
143. Id. 
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Car members are also the only ones allowed to carry firearms and other 
weapons inside the prison; this is also the most visible sign of power and authority 
among inmates and the few state officials, whose main role seems to be merely 
serving as gatekeepers from the outside world and exercising minimal control over 
the population.144 Peacekeeping is entirely left to the members of the Car. The 
población is only permitted to own artisanal chuzos or chillones (makeshift sharp 
knives), which may only be used during community-sanctioned duels at the Coliseo 
(Coliseum) or to defend themselves in case of an uprising or external attack by 
members of an enemy Car or prison wardens.145 
C. From the State of Nature to the Code of the Inmate 
The social norms, customs, and other cultural parameters that govern life in 
prison comprise the Code of the Inmate or La Rutina (The Routine). None of these 
rules, customs, and conventions are compiled anywhere nor exist in writing. They 
are instead transmitted orally, through imitated behavior or restated by the Pran and 
his government when deliberating about matters of collective importance or 
adjudicating disputes. Inmates tend to consider The Routine as a self-evident value 
system and rarely question its legitimacy.146 The general opinion seems to be that 
The Routine is a good thing. Inmates tend to reminisce about the times prior to the 
establishment of any internal order, “when [they] were all natives.”147 The parallel 
to the concept of the Hobbesian State of Nature148 is striking. According to Hobbes, 
the state of nature was the “natural condition of mankind” in absence of 
government, civilization, laws, or any other external power that can limit or restrain 
the natural instinct of humans.149 The absence of a legal system and a government, 
Hobbes asserted, would cause the life of men to be “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish 
and short”.150 The resemblance between the justification of the state by Hobbes, 
on the one hand, and by the Venezuelan inmates on the other, is striking. 
Interestingly, some of the values reflected in The Routine such as the respect 
for other people’s property, the prohibition of unauthorized violence or carrying 
guns, acting on revenge, and gossiping or snitching are aligned with mainstream 
society. Others, like punishment by death, isolation, shaming, and other sanctions 
are definitely not aligned with the values of contemporary society or are even against 
the official legal system. In any case, what is important here is how—unlike in 
Hobbes’ example—the state of nature inside the Venezuelan prison did not produce 
chaos. On the contrary, the absence of the state seems to be one of the main 
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motivators for the inmates to organize themselves and create a social organization 
that takes the place of the official legal system. 
The aforementioned set of rules and customs, and the individuals charged with 
interpreting, declaring, and enforcing those rules, are just two of the three pillars of 
the indigenous justice system featured in the Venezuelan prison. The court-like 
processes comprise a third pillar, which in combination with the other two make up 
a sophisticated regime that contributes to maintain social order. In the next section, 
I turn to explain this system in greater detail. 
III. ADJUDICATION AND ENFORCEMENT BEHIND BARS: PRAN JUSTICE, THE 
UNDERWORLD’S TRIBUNAL AND BEYOND 
As mentioned earlier, the political and social fabric of the subculture prevailing 
in the Venezuelan prison incorporates a predefined set of indigenous norms whose 
enforcement depends on several individuals exercising specific roles. At the apex 
of the pyramid is the Pran who embodies the ethos of the community and has the 
ultimate authority when it comes to important collective decisions. The Pran 
decides if and when war is to be waged against other gangs or groups. He also orders 
any riots, strikes, or protests against the government seeking to assert the interests 
of his constituency. The Pran also plays the role of judge by adjudicating disputes 
between inmates and imposing sanctions for violations to the internal legal order.151 
The individual decisions made by the Pran about a particular matter and his 
directives issued to the general population are communicated and carried out by the 
Luceros or by the Pran’s Second in Command.152 The hierarchy is called Luz 
(Light), and dar luz (to give the light) is to authorize someone to do something.153 
The catalog of norms, a list of possible infractions or violations, and the 
corresponding sanctions are not contained in any document, but the general 
population seems to have a clear understanding of their definition and scope.154 
What an outsider might consider a confusing and seemingly contradictory web of 
double standards, norms, and incomplete principles, inmates deem clear and 
legitimate.155 What makes the cataloging process particularly cumbersome is the 
utmost discretion and secrecy of community members regarding their affairs.156 The 
discussion or revelation to the outside world of what the community deems its 
internal affairs, including disclosing the identity of its members, showing pictures, 
showing videos, or airing out the details of a specific case, may result in several 
sanctions including death.157 This is what—according to the media—happened to 
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former inmate Luidig Ochoa, the author of the YouTube series “Somos Ladrones” 
(We are Robbers) and “Carcel o Infierno” ( Jail or Hell)158 who was assassinated in 
2014.159 
Notwithstanding the aforementioned limitations, it is still possible to identify 
three different dispute resolution and norm enforcement processes according to the 
type of infraction, the circumstances surrounding its commission, and the individual 
or organ charged with carrying out the sanction. The first distinction that needs to 
be made is between infractions in which the offender is caught during the act and 
infractions in which the offender is not caught. The former are generally handled 
directly by the Luceros, who are empowered to carry out a swift sanction that is 
commensurate with the violation and the circumstances surrounding it.160 One 
common example is the case of a garitero (night watch) who is caught asleep or 
distracted during his shift, therefore making the community vulnerable.161 Such 
fault, which the inmates deem a very serious offence to the safety of the entire 
population often warrants an immediate execution by a Lucero.162 This sanction is 
commonly known as the Sueño de la Muerte (“Sleep of Death”), in direct reference 
to the fact that once the sanction is applied the offender will obviously never wake 
up.163 
Executions are often carried out swiftly, discreetly, and without any 
witnesses.164 In fact, such sanctions are always preceded by a general order for 
everybody to hide and seek refuge so no one sees what happened.165 Other 
sanctions are carried out publicly, mostly when the Pran or the Car wants to set a 
symbolic precedent or use them as a deterrent for the rest of the population.166 
Infractions that warrant the capital punishment are rare, and the Pran and his 
cronies do not administer death liberally either.167 One of the reason why extreme 
punishments are avoided is because they bring negative attention and undesired 
visibility of the community from the government; they also create internal social 
tensions, which might lead to a coup against the Pran.168 Moreover, killing 
community members negatively affects the economic equilibrium of the prison.169 
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After all, the more people get killed the lesser the number of workers, “taxpayers,” 
bodyguards, soldiers, and other individuals that are available.170 The restriction of 
the use of violence to a minimum has also been reported in other case studies of 
the underworld, despite the general and unfounded perception that criminal 
syndicates and other deviant groups are predominantly disorganized and ruthless 
toward their own members.171 
An increasingly common type of punishment is ser anegado or exile from the 
territory protected by the Pran.172 Another alternative is the confinement of the 
offender to a special holding area manned by a group of evangelical inmates 
interestingly advertised as the “rehabilitation center.”173 The most common type of 
offenders sent there are the deadbeats or delinquent “taxpayers.”174 
Offenders that are not caught in the act but denounced or accused by other 
community members are generally afforded the possibility of taking part in a trial 
of sorts presided by the Pran with the participation of the accused, the accuser, and 
witnesses.175 The actual process which takes place in the so-called Underworld’s 
Tribunal varies, but it is generally comprised of an oral audience where the accused 
presents his defense, the accuser ratifies the charges, and character witnesses are 
interrogated or called on the phone if they happen to be on the outside.176 
Interestingly, inmates consider that their due process safeguards are better than the 
ones offered by the formal legal system, which they tend to consider unjust, corrupt, 
and illegitimate.177 
A successful litigant is someone que sabe hablar (who knows how to talk) and 
who also has enough social capital so others are willing to hablar por él (speak on his 
behalf ).178 The ability to argue is called tener lirica (to have lyric, golden tongue), 
which depending on the circumstances might be regarded as a positive but also as 
a negative trait.179 The latter corresponds to the perception that those who talk 
much are also inclined to lie and exaggerate, which in turn makes them 
untrustworthy.180 
To any inmates, the fact that there might people with credibility willing to 
speak on their behalf is of the utmost importance.181 Inmates depend on their 
connections both inside the prison and in the outside world not only when they 
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need to defend themselves in “court,” but on a daily basis from the moment when 
they arrive to their place of reclusion.182 In fact, the entrance of a new inmate to the 
prison is surrounded by a great spectacle marked by a public announcement made 
by the gariteros, who often yell the name of the newcomer while he crosses an area 
symbolically called the La franja de Gaza (Gaza Strip).183 Soon thereafter, a 
representative from the evangelical community will greet the new member, and a 
lucero will interview him basically to confirm his identity and pass the information 
onto the Pran.184 Most new arrivals are also greeted by someone willing to protect 
and vouch for them.185 This is called ser rescatado (being rescued).186 
From time to time, the manhood and courage of the new arrivals is also tested 
by someone who attempts to ponerle la mano (put their hand).187 To let another put 
their hand on one’s shoulder might be interpreted as a sign of weakness, which 
might affect the person’s reputation negatively for the rest of their confinement.188 
As in the case of the official legal system, the norms that govern the prison 
subculture sometimes require an authoritative interpretation or clarification, so they 
are adequately applied. 189 Despite their apparent clarity, interpreting the scope of 
the norms that comprise The Rutina occasionally becomes a source of conflict.190 
One example is when two inmates argue whether a specific conduct is “legal” or if 
on the contrary it constitutes a mancha (stain) to the rutina.191 In such case, the Pran 
is the only one with authority to establish the correct construal of the norms.192 His 
role is similar to that of a constitutional court in mainstream society. 
CONCLUSION 
The features of the internal normative order of the inmates described in this 
article put the prison subculture in a difficult place. On the one hand, it emerges 
and operates in an environment that glorifies violence, discrimination, and other 
values that run against the official legal system and mainstream society; but on the 
other, it mimics a highly bureaucratic order where concerns for a medieval idea of 
“due process,” legitimacy, and community order seem to be paramount. The high 
importance that the Prans and their fellow inmates have placed on their social 
organization and the meticulous regulation of even the most mundane of daily 
activities, are viewed as essential to maintain order within the community. Albeit 
 
182. Id. 
183. Id. 
184. Id. 
185. Id. 
186. Id. 
187. Id. 
188. Id. 
189. Id. 
190. Id. 
191. Id. 
192. Id. 
First to Printer_Gomez (Do Not Delete) 8/30/2018  10:42 AM 
206 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8:183 
 
primitive in many ways, the internal legal system of the Venezuelan prison features 
institutions, processes, and actors that emulate the basic structure of mainstream 
society. 
As this article showed, the absence of the state and the chaos created by the 
malfunctioning of its official legal institutions have incentivized Venezuelan 
inmates to devise their own legal system and attain a level of intra-community social 
control that counters the conventional wisdom that they are bound to live in chaos. 
The indigenous norms created by the incarcerated, regulate both the substantive 
rights and the means through which those rights are enforced. The draconian 
sanctions imposed by the Pran against those who breach the fragile internal social 
order of the prison are viewed as necessary measures to maintain the peace in an 
otherwise volatile environment. Sanctions, however, cannot be administered 
liberally or irrationally, because too much harshness might also provoke an uprising 
against the Pran and threaten the stability of his mandate. As a result, Prans are also 
required to consider the political implications of their decisions and constantly re-
assess their legitimacy or face the risk of being overthrown and killed. 
The Pran justice system is primitive and flawed, but it nonetheless fulfills an 
important role in the penitentiary microcosm where the official legal system is 
largely absent. Contrary to what some would think, even those who are routinely at 
odds with the laws of the state and mainstream society, do not and cannot opt out 
entirely from all existing forms of social control. The urge to attain a minimum level 
of social organization, to create and abide by a set of norms and maintain order 
seems to become particularly important when the state fails. It appears as if some 
chaos is acceptable, but not total chaos. 
  
